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Abstract
This paper develops a model with multiple market locations in which the quality of intangible
assets of firms, provided by management, determines the firms. performance. Despite an ex
ante symmetry of potential entrants, the equilibrium assignment of heterogeneous managerial
skills to firms tends to be asymmetric. This sorting outcome determines both the goods
market structure at single locations and the size distribution of firms. Results are consistent
with a number of observed patterns regarding the size distribution of firms and
establishments, and the relation of firm size to profitability, productivity, managerial skills
and manager remuneration.
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the industrialized world, intangible assets like organizational know-how, product
design, trademarks and the internal human capital stock are key factors for the
performance of ￿rms. Development of intangible assets, e.g., through product de-
sign, organization of production, marketing and informal training of workers, is the
responsibility of the management of a ￿rm and gives rise to economies of scale and
imperfect product markets. These observations suggest that there are important
interactions between product market characteristics and the market for managerial
skills. This paper develops a model which analyzes this interaction. By doing so, the
model is capable to explain empirical regularities regarding the size distribution of
￿rms and establishments, and the relation of ￿rm size to pro￿tability, productivity,
managerial skills and manager remuneration in a uni￿ed framework.
The basic hypothesis of the model is that the quality of intangible assets depends
on an (aggregate) index of managerial skills in ￿rms.1 Firms set up head departments
by hiring managers from a heterogeneous distribution of skills. Managerial wage
costs for the development of intangible assets are endogenous and treated as sunk
costs at the product market competition stage. There is free entry of ￿rms into the
economy and all potential entrants are ex ante identical. The economy has multiple
market locations and entry into single markets is a prerequisite to participate in local
product market competition. After the hiring of managers, ￿rms choose the market
range in which they operate, i.e., their number of plants or branches. Intangible
assets are geographically non-rival, i.e., are common assets for ￿rms in any market
location they are active (e.g., Markusen (1995), Wong (1995)). However, there
are ￿Coasian￿ diseconomies of scale in coordinating and governing single plants or
branches (e.g., Williamson (1975), Porter (1986)).
According to the model, product markets and the market for managerial skills
interact in the following way. On the one hand, the nature of product market
1Also quantitatively, managerial employment is important. According to Berman, Bound and
Grilichis (1994, Tab. I), in U.S. manufacturing the employment share in managerial occupations
was 10.9 percent in 1987, with rising tendency. See also Grossmann (2002).
2competition determines, for a given wage structure, the incentive of ￿rms to hire
managers with high skills. On the other hand, the sorting of managerial skills in
￿rms determines both the goods market structure at single locations and the size
distribution of ￿rms. It is shown under which product market characteristics and
technological conditions an asymmetric equilibrium assignment of managers to ￿rms
is obtained despite an ex ante symmetry of potential entrants.2
After analyzing the general structure of the model, both the results and the
equilibrium concept are illustrated by specifying the nature of product market com-
petition. In these examples, the quality of intangible assets is re￿ected by the
perceived quality of goods or unit production costs. First, it is shown that under
monopolistic competition ￿ la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), ￿rms are completely segre-
gated by managerial skill if the price elasticity of demand is suﬃciently high, i.e., if
product market competition is intense. The underlying reason is that, in this case,
small diﬀerences in the quality of intangible assets become magni￿ed in large pro￿t
diﬀerences, with greater magni￿cation for higher quality levels. All other things
equal, this leads to high incentives for ￿rms to hire good managers, implying a
symmetry-breaking feedback eﬀect on the assignment of managerial skills to ￿rms.
This driving force towards asymmetry of managerial job assignment is also at work
in a second example, which examines monopolistic competition under linear demand
schedules (Ottaviano and Thisse (1999)).
The literature on assignment of heterogeneous workers to ￿rms has recently
gained renewed interest (e.g., Kremer (1993), Kremer and Maskin (1996), Saint-
2Related literature usually predicts that symmetry of potential entrants leads to symmetric
free-entry equilibria. For instance, in standard versions of ￿love of variety￿ models of monopolistic
competition (Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)), ￿ideal variety￿ models (Lancaster (1979),
Helpman (1981)) or ￿location￿ (spatial) models (Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979)) the number of
active ￿rms is determined by some exogenous entry costs and ￿rms are ex post identical. An
exception is Fishman and Rob (1999) who study a model with a given number of initially identical
￿rms, in which cost shocks generate an asymmetric steady-state equilibrium. Another strand of
literature are models of industry dynamics, which usually assume ex ante heterogeneous ￿rms
(e.g., Jovanovic (1982), Athey and Schmutzler (2001)). The present model may be viewed as
complementary to this literature, explaining why ￿rms diﬀer in the ￿rst place.
3Paul (2001), Shimer and Smith (2000), Shimer (2001), Prat (2002)). This literature
highlights the role of technological complementarity and spillovers among workers
for a segregation of ￿rms by their workers￿ skill. (For a comprehensive review of
the less recent literature on job assignment, see Sattinger (1993).) In contrast,
this paper derives asymmetric equilibria with respect to the sorting of skills from
product market characteristics, by accounting for the role of intangible assets for
the performance of ￿rms.
The work of Rosen (1982) and Saint-Paul (2001) are most closely related to the
present analysis. Saint-Paul (2001) shows that, by allowing for intra-￿rm spillovers
when output of a homogenous good is a function of an aggregate skill index, typi-
cally, the equilibrium assignment of workers is segregated and the wage distribution
skewed to the right. He applies his model to analyze the impact of new information
technology on segmentation and wage inequality. Thus, his focus is very diﬀerent
from the present multi-market context in which managerial quality is the key to
create valuable intangible assets and the sorting equilibrium depends on product
market characteristics. Rosen (1982) examines the relationship between ￿rm size,
managerial job assignment and managerial wages by focussing on the supervisory
role of management. In his analysis, good managers sort in large ￿rms and receive
high rewards because of a technological complementarity between supervising skills
and the span of control. In contrast, in the present analysis, for ￿rms to be large in
the ￿rst place they have to attract good managers who create valuable intangible
assets. Moreover, the present paper also studies the number of establishments as
measure for ￿rm size, in addition to output, sales or employment.
Results are consistent with the following patterns which are discussed in more
detail at the end of this paper. (i) The size distribution of ￿rms and plants within in-
dustries is highly skewed to the right (e.g., Sutton (1997)); (ii) both larger ￿rms and
￿rms with higher market shares are more pro￿table (e.g., Schmalensee, 1989); (iii)
there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity among ￿rms and establishments with
respect to productivity levels, with larger ￿rms and plants being more productive
(e.g., Bartelsman and Doms (2000)); (iv) larger ￿rms employ better workers (e.g.,
4Troske (1999)), and, particularly, average managerial skill levels substantially dif-
fer across ￿rms (e.g., O￿Shaughnessy, Levine and Capelli (2001)); ￿nally, (v) larger
￿rms pay substantially higher managerial wages (e.g., Conyon and Murphy (2000)).
T h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .I ns e c t i o n2 ,t h em o d e li sp r e s e n t e da n di t s
crucial assumptions are discussed. Section 3 de￿nes the equilibrium and character-
izes market ranges, pro￿ts, the assignment of managers and the measure of ￿rms
in equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates both the results and the equilibrium concept
by specifying the nature of imperfect competition in the multiple goods markets.
Section 5 shows how the results derived from the model relate to the observed pat-
terns (i)-(v) above. Section 6 summarizes the main results. All proofs and extensive
derivations are relegated to an appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
This section presents the model and discusses its main assumptions.
2.1 Set Up
Firms are characterized by intangible assets which aﬀect the ￿rms￿ productivity
or (perceived) product quality, respectively. There is a large number of potential
entrants in the economy and entry is free. Let I =[ 0 ,I] be the set of ￿rms which
actually enter. Firms are pro￿t-maximizers.
Labor supply is inelastic and normalized to unity. Workers diﬀer in their abil-
ity h to develop intangible assets, called managerial skill level.L e t g(h) be the
mass function of the distribution of skill supply, with support being the set H =
{h0,h 1,...,hK}, 0 ≤ h0 <h 1 <. . .<h K < ∞. There exists an outside earnings
option ﬂ W ≥ 0 for types when not being assigned as manager, i.e., with respect to all
non-managerial tasks, labor is homogenous (see, e.g., Lucas (1978)). In the general
equilibrium examples of section 4, ﬂ W i st h ew a g er a t ef o rp r o d u c t i o nw o r k e r s .F i r m s
take wages w(h), h ∈ H, as given; there is a Walrasian auctioneer in the labor mar-
ket, implementing a wage schedule which ful￿lls equilibrium conditions as de￿ned
5in section 3.3 below (see De￿nition 2). Workers seek the highest wage.
Firms may (endogenously) diﬀer in a single parameter αi, i ∈ I, called quality of
intangible assets. Intangible assets are created in the ￿rms￿ head departments which
consist of an exogenous mass (￿size￿) s of managerial workers, with 0 <s≤ g(h)
for all h ∈ H. The quality index αi is determined by the average managerial skill
level in the head department of ￿rm i, denoted by ﬂ hi ∈ H =[ h0,h K]. Formally, let
a : H → R+ be a strictly monotonic increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable
function, so that3
αi = a(ﬂ hi). (1)
There is a continuum of market locations (￿markets￿), indexed by m,w h i c ha r e
represented as points in the unit interval [0,1]. In order to produce and sell products
in a single market, ￿rms have to incur set up costs, e.g., for opening up a plant or
branch, introducing a marketing campaign at a location or costs associated with red
tape. It is assumed that these costs only depend on the measure of markets in which
a ￿rm decides to operate, called market range. Formally, let Mi ⊆ [0,1] be the set
of markets in which ￿rm i ∈ I is active and let qi b et h eL e b e s g u em e a s u r eo fMi.
(It is assumed that Mi ∈ M,w h e r eM is the σ-algebra of Borel sets for the unit
interval.) Firm i￿s total set up costs are given by Q(qi),w h e r eQ :[ 0 ,1] → R+ is
a monotonic increasing, convex and twice continuously diﬀerentiable function with
Q(0) = 0.
Let α, M and q denote mappings which assign to each ￿rm i a quality of intan-
gible assets αi,as e to fm a r k e t sMi in which the ￿rm is active and a corresponding
market range qi, respectively, i ∈ I. The timing of events evolves according to the
following stages, with decisions at each stage made simultaneously by ￿rms.
￿ At stage 1, each ￿rm i ∈ I creates intangible assets by hiring managers from
3The size s of head departments could be treated as choice variable of ￿rms by replacing (1) by
αi = b(ﬂ hi,s), as long as b(•) is not ever increasing in s (holding ﬂ hi constant). (Such a limitation of
size advantages can be justi￿ed by internal coordination problems which imply that a ￿rm￿s head
department has an optimal size.) This would not alter the main conclusions of this paper, but
would considerably complicate the analysis. For simplicity, s is exogenous here.
6the set H, which determines α, according to equation (1). Wage costs for
managers are sunk at later stages.
￿ At stage 2, ￿rms decide in which markets to be active, i.e., each ￿rm i ∈ I
chooses a set Mi ∈ M,w h i c hd e t e r m i n e sM and q, respectively.
￿ At stage 3, ￿rms enter product market competition.
The analysis is not restricted to a particular type of imperfect competition model
but generally applies to any form of imperfect product market competition in which
intangible assets matter for the performance of ￿rms. The role of intangible assets
for the pro￿ts of ￿r m sa ts t a g e3i ss p e c i ￿ed as follows. Denote pro￿t realizations
of ￿rm i from product market competition at stage 3 in market m by πi,m.T h e
mapping M, which assigns a set of markets Mi to each ￿rm i ∈ I,d e t e r m i n e sf o r
each m ∈ [0,1] the set Nm := {i ∈ I| m ∈ Mi} of ￿rms operating in market m.
If ￿rm i does not enter market m,p r o ￿ts at stage 3 in this market are zero, i.e.,
πi,m =0if i/ ∈ Nm.I fi ∈ Nm, πi,m depends on the ￿rm￿s strength αi a n do nt h e
competitive pressure exerted by its rivals.
A higher quality αi raises πi,m in any market m ∈ Mi (in which ￿rm i is active)
similarly. This re￿ects the idea that intangible assets are geographical non-rival
(as discussed in section 2.2). Competitive pressure in a market m depends on the
strengths of rivals αj, j ∈ Nm, j 6= i. Thus, generally, pro￿ts at stage 3 in each
market m depend on α, i.e., on the quality levels of intangible assets developed at
stage 1, and on the mappings M, q, resulting from the ￿rms￿ decisions at stage 2
about which and how many markets to enter. The analysis focusses on (equilibrium)
situations in which, given α,f o ra n yq,t h ep r o ￿t-maximizing choices of market sets
Mi at stage 2 are such that each ￿rm earns the same pro￿ta ts t a g e3i na n ym a r k e t
it is active. More formally, let z ≡ (α,q) denote the mapping which assigns a
pair (αi,q i) to each ￿rm i; then, one can write πi,m = π(αi|z) if i ∈ Nm.A s a
consequence, the pro￿tp r o s p e c t sπi,m faced by a ￿rm when deciding about αi and
qi depend on z,n o to ns p e c i ￿c conditions in single markets.4 Since single ￿rms
4To see this, consider a situation in which competitive pressure diﬀers across markets. Suppose
7have measure zero, competitive pressure under (α0,q0) i st h es a m ea su n d e r(α,q)
if α0
i = αi and q0
i = qi for almost all i ∈ I. Competitive pressure under (α0,q0) is
higher than under (α,q) if α0
i ≥ αi and q0
i ≥ qi with at least one strict inequality
holding for a positive mass of ￿rms i ∈ I. For instance, suppose there are two
types of ￿rms, indexed k =0 ,1, and denote the respective set of ￿rms by I0 and
I1, respectively; i.e., I = I0 ∪ I1.L e t (αi,q i)=( αk,q k) for all i ∈ Ik, k =0 ,1.
Then, for all i ∈ Nm and for all m ∈ [0,1], πi,m = π(αi|z) is increasing in αi and
decreasing in α0, α1, q0 and q1. (See the examples in section 4.) The following
assumption summarizes the properties of stage 3 equilibria required for the further
analysis.
Assumption 1. For any z =( α,q) there exists a real-valued function π(αi|z),
twice continuously diﬀerentiable in αi,s ot h a tπi,m = π(αi|z) if i ∈ Nm, m ∈
[0,1],a n dπ satis￿es the following properties: (i)
∂π(αi|•)
∂αi > 0; (ii) for z =( α,q),
z0 =( α0,q0),w eh a v eπ(αi|z)=π(αi|z0) if competitive pressure under (α,q) and
(α0,q0) is the same, and π(αi|z) < π(αi|z0) if competitive pressure under (α,q) is
higher than under (α0,q0).
Assumption 1 greatly simpli￿es the analysis, as the decision problem of each ￿rm
i ∈ I at stage 2 can be reduced to the choice of market ranges qi rather than the
choice of the entire sets Mi.
Note that the ￿rm￿s objective function at stage 2 is the sum of ￿rm i￿s pro￿ts
at stage 3 over all single markets in which it is active minus total entry costs Q(qi).
As ￿rms have a negligible impact, they correctly take z as given at stage 2. Thus,
Assumption 1 implies that, given z,t h eo p t i m a lc h o i c eo fr a n g eqi of a ￿rm which
has created a quality of intangible assets αi at stage 1 reads
￿ q(αi|z): =a r gm a x
0≤qi≤1
{qiπ(αi|z) − Q(qi)}. (2)
πi,m > πi,m0 for m,m0 ∈ Mi, i.e., competitive pressure in m0 is higher than in m. It is assumed that
this cannot hold in an equilibrium because then other ￿rms j/ ∈ Nm should have been induced to
enter market m as well, or ￿rm i should have abstained to enter market m0. Thus, in equilibrium,
πi,m = πi,m0 for all m,m0 ∈ Mi and for all i ∈ I.
82.2 Discussion of the Set Up
Before beginning the equilibrium analysis, let me brie￿y discuss the set up of the
model.
2.2.1 Managerial Skills and Intangible Assets
It is assumed that intangible assets have to be developed ex ante by managerial la-
bor. For instance, managerial activities include the creation of analytical databases
and intra-￿rm networks, which support the design of products, customer services
and marketing strategies (e.g., Bresnahan (1999)). These tasks aﬀect the (perceived)
quality of goods. Moreover, managerial abilities aﬀect the eﬃciency of the organi-
zational structure of a ￿rm (and, thus, productivity) by developing management
techniques and ￿rm-speci￿c human capital (human resource management). Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that ￿managerial quality may be an important factor
behind productivity heterogeneity￿ (Bartelsman and Doms (2000, p. 587)). As the
creation of intangible assets relate to R&D and marketing activities, taking place
prior to product market competition, the model borrows from the IO literature
on investment games by treating corresponding outlays as endogenous sunk costs
(e.g., Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), Sutton (1998)). In fact, the present model
allows one to lead back endogenous sunk costs (i.e., managerial wages) to individ-
ual characteristics, accounting for individual heterogeneity and observing resource
constraints.
2.2.2 Geographical Non-rivalry of Intangible Assets
According to the set up of section 2.1, the quality of intangible assets, αi,i s￿rm-
speci￿c, rather than plant-speci￿c. This re￿ects the public good nature of intangible
assets from the perspective of a ￿rm (therefore often called ￿common assets￿ in the
literature). For instance, αi corresponds to the perceived quality of the product(s)
of ￿rm i in any market it chooses to be active. In this case, αi can be interpreted as
the consumers￿ valuation of ￿rm i￿s product design(s) or trademark. According to
the literature on the boundaries of (multi-plant) ￿rms, intangible assets give rise to
9ownership advantages.5 In particular, this applies to multinational ￿rms. In fact,
￿rms in advertising-intensive industries are more likely to incur foreign direct in-
vestment (Martin (1991)). Moreover, ￿rm-speci￿c marketing advantages and trade-
marked goods induce ￿rms to ￿globalize￿ (e.g., Markusen (1995), Wong (1995)). As
another example, think about αi as productivity of ￿rm i. In fact, empirical evi-
dence suggests that productivity in single plants of a ￿rm is positively related to the
productivity of the headquarter of this ￿rm (Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992)).
2.2.3 Entry into single markets
According to the model, entry into single markets is a prerequisite to participate
in local product market competition, i.e., ￿rms have to open a plant or branch
in order to compete in a speci￿cm a r k e t . 6 Moreover, it is implicitly assumed that
costs of internal transactions are lower than those through market transactions (e.g.,
licensing).7 Q(•) constitutes plant-related sunk costs of ￿rms, which have to be
incurred in addition to the sunk costs for developing intangible assets. A strictly
convex shape of Q(•) may be justi￿ed by logistic problems of ￿rms to coordinate
and govern single plants or branches. Microeconomic foundations of this assumption
can be found in the literature on internal coordination problems (initiated by Coase
(1937)). Reasons include diseconomies of scale in governing plants (Porter (1986))
5The notion of ownership advantages relates to the famous OLI approach (e.g., Dunning (1981)).
On the characteristics of multinational ￿rms, see, e.g., Caves (1982) and Morck and Yeung (1992).
6For instance, suppose that transport costs are prohibitively high. Examples include service
enterprises like hotel chains, restaurants, banks, airlines or car-rental companies. Moreover, think
about ￿rms which have own retail branches (for reasons related to marketing or trademarks) like
Douglas, H&M, IKEA, automobile manufactures, etc.
7According to the OLI framework, these two assumptions refer to locational and internal-
ization advantages, respectively. Possible reasons for internalization advantages include agency
problems (Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1991, 1994)), asset speci￿city (Williamson (1979, 1985) or
non-contractible investments (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)). For a com-
prehensive outline of this literature, see, e.g., Holmstr￿m and Roberts (1998). Interestingly, these
authors advise to study common assets as determinant for ￿rm boundaries, rather than focussing
on incentive problems only. This is the route taken in the present paper.
10and costs of bureaucracies (Williamson (1975)).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
This section solves the model by backward induction. The solution characterizes
market ranges, pro￿ts, the wage structure, the assignment of ability types to ￿rms
and the measure of ￿rms in an equilibrium.
3.1 Product Market Competition (Stage 3)
Product market competition at stage 3 takes place in each market m ∈ [0,1] sep-
arately, with the set of ￿rms I, the qualities of intangible assets α and market
ranges q being already determined. According to Assumption 1, this leads to pro￿t
realizations π(αi|z) of a ￿rm with strength αi in any market it is active, given the
competitive pressure in the economy under z =( α,q).
3.2 Firms￿ Choice of Markets (Stage 2)
Optimal behavior of ￿rms i ∈ I at stage 2, after creation of intangible assets at
stage 1, is given by (2). This implies the following for an equilibrium at stage 2.
De￿nition 1. (Equilibrium at stage 2). Given the set of ￿rms I and the
mapping α, in an equilibrium, we have ￿ z =( α,￿ q) with ￿ qi =￿ q(αi| ￿ z), i ∈ I.
As ￿rms take z as given when choosing market ranges, in equilibrium, the optimal
choices of ￿rms￿ market range, given by ￿ q, must be consistent with the resulting
competitive pressure under these optimal choices, i.e., ￿ z =( α,￿ q).8 Equilibrium
pro￿ts of a ￿rm i ∈ I at stage 2 (￿gross pro￿ts￿) then read
Π(αi| ￿ z): =￿ qiπ(αi| ￿ z) − Q(￿ qi). (3)
8If there is a ￿nite set of types of ￿rms, as in the examples considered in section 4 below,
the existence of an equilibrium at stage 2 can be established by applying standard ￿xed point
theorems. Also note that there may be multiple equilibria, which, however, causes no problems in
our analysis.
11Applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to the maximization problem (2), for all i ∈ I,
￿ qi > 0 ful￿lls the condition
π(αi| ￿ z) ≥ Q
0(￿ qi), (4)
which is binding if ￿ qi < 1.9 Note that ￿ qi < 1 for some i ∈ I only if Q(qi) is
strictly convex for at least some qi ∈ (0,1]. To see this, suppose to the contrary
that Q(•) would not be strictly convex somewhere. Then π(αi| ￿ z) ≥ Q0(1) and
￿ qi =1would hold. As argued above, a strictly convex shape of set up costs Q(•) is a
natural property which re￿ects diseconomies of scale in coordinating single branches
or plants. The following result emerges. (All results are proven in appendix A.)






A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,￿rms with high-quality intangible assets are not
only more pro￿table but, if anything, also have wider market ranges than ￿rms with
low-quality intangible assets. If Q(•) is strictly convex, then αi > αj implies ￿ qi > ￿ qj
whenever ￿ qj < 1. Fig. 1 provides a graphical representation of Proposition 1 in this
case. Making use of (3), diﬀerences in gross pro￿ts of ￿rms i and j are given by the
shaded area.
The next subsection shows that despite a completely symmetric situation of
potential entrants in the economy, the quality of intangible assets (and, thus, pro￿ts
as well as, possibly, market ranges) may indeed diﬀer among ￿rms in equilibrium, as
an implication of the endogenous sorting of managers into head departments. For
both the intuition of this central result and its implication for the size distribution
of ￿rms (discussed in section 5), the following auxiliary result will prove helpful.
9Clearly, π(αi| ￿ z) >Q 0(0) and thus ￿ qi > 0 in any equilibrium, because otherwise a ￿rm would
not enter the economy in the ￿rst place. Also note that Π(αi| ￿ z) > 0 for all i ∈ I, according to
(3), (4), π(αi| ￿ z) >Q 0(0), the convexity of Q(•) and Q(0) = 0.
12Figure 1: Profits and market ranges of firms i and j if  j i α α > .
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As will be seen below, strict convexity of reduced-form pro￿ts at stage 3, π(αi|•),
in αi gives rise to a complete segregation of ￿rms by managerial skill.
3.3 Assignment of Managerial Skills (Stage 1)
The ￿rms￿ decision problem at stage 1 is to choose the quality of intangible assets
αi by hiring managers. First, de￿ne a class of ￿assignment functions￿




￿ G describes the feasible hiring policies of a ￿rm. At stage 1, each ￿rm i ∈ I
chooses an assignment function ￿ gi ∈ ￿ G. Depending on this hiring policy, the average




h￿ gi(h).A sαi = a(ﬂ hi),t h es e to f
functions ￿ gi ∈ ￿ G, i ∈ I, determines the mapping α. It is helpful to rede￿ne pro￿ts






We are now ready to set up conditions for an equilibrium at stage 1.
De￿nition 2. (Equilibrium at stage 1). An equilibrium set of assignment
functions ￿ g∗
i ∈ ￿ G, i ∈ I, together with a mapping w from H to R+ (wage schedule),
ful￿ll the following conditions:

















i(h) and z∗ =( α∗,q∗),w i t hα∗





(b) Given z∗,n op r o ￿table deviation exists, i.e., for all ￿ g0



























i(h)di < g(h),t h e nw(h)= ﬂ W.
Condition (a) of De￿nition 2 means that the total wage bill for managers em-
ployed in the head department of a ￿rm (i.e., the endogenous sunk cost for the
creation of intangible assets) is equal to its gross pro￿t, i.e., net pro￿ts of all ￿rms
are zero in equilibrium. In view of free entry of ￿rms into the economy and the com-
petition of ￿rms for managerial skills in a perfect labor market, this is a consistent
requirement. With symmetry of potential entrants ex ante, the only possibility for a
￿rm to become more pro￿table (in terms of gross pro￿ts at stage 2) than other ￿rms
is to attract higher-skilled managers on average. Higher gross pro￿ts of a ￿rm just
transmit into a higher average wage per manager of a ￿rm. Also note that, in any
equilibrium, ￿rms must correctly foresee the competitive pressure z∗,w h i c hr e s u l t s
from optimizing behavior of ￿rms at stages 1 and 2 (recall De￿nition 1), as well as
from product market competition at stage 3. Condition (b) re￿ects that, at stage
1, each ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts taking both competitive pressure z∗ and the wage
schedule w(h), h ∈ H, as given. To see this, note that for any given wage schedule
w(h), h ∈ H,n o￿rm i wants to deviate from ￿ g∗
























for all alternative assignment functions ￿ g0
i ∈ ￿ G (leading to ﬂ h0
i). Inequality (8) then
directly follows from (9) by using the zero-pro￿t condition (a). According to condi-
tion (c), all types h ∈ H from the potential pool of managers must at least receive




ﬂz∗) ≥ s ﬂ W for all i ∈ I, i.e., sunk costs are bounded from below by s ﬂ W.A s
argued in section 3.4, this determines the equilibrium measure of ￿rms I∗ under
free-entry. Condition (c) also says that the market for managerial skills must clear
for any type h unless workers are paid their outside option. To see this, suppose




i(h)di < g(h). This means that there is excess supply for man-
14agerial positions as workers seek the highest wage. However, this is inconsistent with
a Walrasian equilibrium in the labor market. In contrast, if w(h)= ﬂ W for some
type h,t h e nt h i st y p ei si n d i ﬀerent whether or not to be assigned as manager.
Remark 1. De￿nition 2 extends the equilibrium de￿nition in Saint-Paul (2001)
to analyze the assignment of managerial skills to head departments of ￿rms in an
imperfect competition, multi-market context in which managers develop intangi-
ble assets. In contrast, Saint-Paul examines the relationship between technological
change and wage inequality by studying the assignment of production workers to
￿rms under perfect competition. Formally, however, the basic model of Saint-Paul
is a special case of the present framework in which ﬂ W =0(i.e., there is no out-







for all i ∈ I.T h a t i s , i n
his model, a(ﬂ hi) is ￿rm i￿s output of a homogenous (numeraire) good in a single
market when employing s workers with average skill level ﬂ hi.( T h e r ea r en os e tu p
costs for market entry.) Using this, conditions (a) and (b) of De￿nition 2 hold in







), although wage costs do not have
t h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no fs u n ki n v e s t m e n t si nt h es e tu po fS a i n t - P a u l .M o r e o v e r ,i nh i s
model w(h) > 0(= ﬂ W) for all h; i.e., there is full employment of all types, according
to equilibrium condition (c). Correspondingly, the equilibrium measure of ￿rms is
given by I∗ =1 /s in this case.10
We are now ready to derive the equilibrium wage structure. De￿ne the sets
Si := {h ∈ H :￿ g∗
i(h) > 0} which contain managerial skill levels (of a total mass
s of types) hired in equilibrium by i ∈ I.L e tS be a mapping which assigns a set
Si to each ￿rm i,c a l l e da nequilibrium con￿guration of manager assignments.A l s o
de￿ne S := ∪
i∈I
Si, i.e., S ⊆ H is the subset of managerial skill levels assigned to
head departments in equilibrium. At stage 1, each ￿rm i ∈ I chooses an assignment
10As shown in section 3.4 and illustrated in appendix, if ﬂ W>0, by contrast, the equilibrium
measure of ￿rms I∗ depends on all exogenous factors, i.e., besides on size s of head departments,
on the product demand structure, the nature of product market competition, technologies, and
the distribution of managerial skills.





￿ gi(h)w(h),t a k i n gz∗ and the
wage schedule w(h) for each type h ∈ H as given. Observing equilibrium conditions
(a)-(c) of De￿nition 2, we can characterize the equilibrium wage schedule as follows.
















for all h ∈ S, with equality if h ∈ Si, i ∈ I;
(ii) there exists hmin ∈ H such that S = {hmin,...,hK};
(iii) w(h) > ﬂ W for all h>h min;




ﬂz∗)/s, i ∈ I.
According to part (i), within the head department of a ￿rm i ∈ I (i.e., for all
h ∈ Si), the equilibrium wage schedule is colinear. This is a direct implication of
the assumption that a ￿rm i￿s quality of intangible assets αi depends on the average
managerial skill level ﬂ hi it hires. The right-hand side of (10) gives the marginal
bene￿t from hiring a manager of type h for a ￿rm with average skill level ﬂ h∗
i under
the zero-pro￿t condition (7). Thus, in equilibrium, type h is not employed in such
a ￿rm if w(h) exceeds this marginal bene￿t. (Compare to Saint-Paul (2001).) Part
(ii) states that there is an endogenous cut-oﬀ ability level hmin (i.e., a minimum
skill) for managers. According to part (iii), workers whose managerial skills exceed
those of the least skilled type hmin assigned as manager have strictly higher earnings
than their outside opportunity ﬂ W in equilibrium (whereas w(hmin)= ﬂ W if some
workers of type hmin are not assigned as manager, according to part (c) of De￿nition
2). Finally, according to part (iv), any worker of type ﬂ h∗
i must obtain a wage rate
equal to the average wage (or average gross pro￿t, respectively) per manager in ￿rm
i (whether or not type ﬂ h∗
i is actually employed in ￿rm i).
Armed with the results of Proposition 2, the equilibrium assignment of managers
is analyzed next. First, the following de￿nition is made.
De￿nition 3. (Polar cases). An equilibrium con￿guration of manager assign-
ments S is called hypersegregated if Si = {ﬂ h∗
i} for all i ∈ I, i.e., if all ￿rms hire a
16single type of manager only. S is called symmetric if ﬂ h∗
i = ﬂ h∗ for all i ∈ I, i.e., if
the average managerial skill level is the same in each ￿rm.
The following proposition shows under which properties these polar cases occur
in equilibrium, which also plays a crucial role in the examples of section 4.
Proposition 3. (Properties of stage 2 pro￿ts and polar cases). In any equilib-
rium, the con￿guration of manager assignments S is hypersegregated (symmetric)
if pro￿t functions at stage 2, f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ
ﬂz), evaluated at equilibrium values ﬂ h∗
i and z∗,
i ∈ I, are strictly convex (strictly concave) in ﬂ hi.
Intuitively, Proposition 3 can be understood by the properties of the managerial
wage schedule, derived in Proposition 2. First, suppose that f(h|•)/s is strictly
convex in h, as depicted by the solid line in Fig. 2. If ￿rm i employs more than
one type of manager, then, in any equilibrium, the wage diﬀerential w(￿ h) − w(￿ h)
between two types ￿ h,￿ h ∈ Si is proportional to the skill diﬀerential ￿ h − ￿ h.T h e
average gross pro￿t per manager of this ￿rm, with average managerial skill ﬂ hi,i s
given by f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ
ﬂ•)/s.T h u s , w a g e s w(￿ h) and w(￿ h) lie on the tangent (indicated by
the dotted line) of f(h|•)/s at ﬂ hi (point A). Now suppose ￿rm i would raise its
average managerial skill level from ﬂ hi to ﬂ h0
i by replacing some managers of type ￿ h
by some of type ￿ h>￿ h. This leads to additional average wage cost per manager
of CD and to additional average gross pro￿ts per manager of BD. As BD > CD,
this means that, whenever ￿rm i employs more than one type of manager under
strict convexity of f(h|•) in h,ap r o ￿table deviation exists. However, this violates
equilibrium condition (b) of De￿nition 2. Consequently, S is hypersegregated.





as in Saint-Paul (2001) (see Remark 1), then
a00(•) > 0 (￿increasing marginal returns to skill￿) implies complete segregation of
skills in sorting equilibrium. As argued by Saint-Paul, this corresponds to the spe-
cial case of an ￿O-ring￿ production function, analyzed by Kremer (1993), in which
workers exert spillovers on each other at all skill levels. In the present context, if
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Dthe pro￿t function at stage 3, π(αi|•), is strictly convex in αi, and, for instance,
a(ﬂ hi)=ﬂ hi,t h e na l s of(ﬂ hi
ﬂ
ﬂz) is strictly convex in ﬂ hi, according to Lemma 1. As
ar e s u l t ,a c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,￿rms are completely segregated by managerial
skill in equilibrium, even without intra-￿rm spillovers. In turn, ￿rms diﬀer in gross
pro￿ts and, possibly, in market ranges, according to Proposition 1. As will be seen
in section 4, strict convexity of pro￿t functions in perceived product quality or the
level of productivity, respectively, is indeed a natural property in standard imperfect
competition models. Generally, and in contrast to the previous literature on job as-
signment, product market characteristics determine the equilibrium outcome of the
sorting process. Assuming increasing marginal returns to skill in the technology
to create intangible assets would just be an additional force towards asymmetric
equilibria in the present analysis.
Second, strict concavity of f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ ﬂz∗) in ﬂ hi implies that all ￿rms must have the
same average managerial skill level in equilibrium. This directly follows from the
fact (established in the proof of Proposition 3) that the wage schedule for managers
in a more pro￿table ￿rm cannot be less steep than in a less pro￿table ￿rm.
The next proposition generally characterizes the equilibrium con￿guration of
manager assignments which results from the endogenous sorting of managers into
head departments of ￿rms.
Proposition 4. (General sorting property). The equilibrium con￿guration of
manager assignments S can be characterized by a partition of S = {hmin,...,hK}
into adjacent subsets Sϕ,i n d e x e dϕ ∈ Φ,w h i c hf u l ￿ll the following. There exist
Iϕ := {i ∈ I : Si ⊆ Sϕ} such that ∪
i∈Iϕ
Si = Sϕ for all ϕ ∈ Φ.
Proposition 4 says that, for instance, in an asymmetric equilibrium (i.e., when-
ever ﬂ hi 6= ﬂ hj for some i,j ∈ I), if ￿rm i hires managers from some subset Si =
{hk,...,hl} ⊂ H and ﬂ h∗
i > (<)ﬂ h∗
j, then all managers in ￿rm j have skills h ≤ hl
(h ≥ hk). This also implies that the wage schedule within two ￿rms which hire
managers from the same subset Sϕ ⊆ H i st h es a m ei nb o t h￿rms, according to part
(i) of Proposition 2.
183.4 Entry and the Number of Firms
This subsection shows how the equilibrium measure of ￿rms, denoted I∗,c a nb e
determined by observing the equilibrium conditions in De￿nition 2 (in particular,
condition (c)) together with Proposition 2.
If ﬂ W =0 , then entry is restricted by the resource constraint for managerial
types, i.e., I∗ =1 /s and hmin = h0. Generally, allowing for ﬂ W>0, the equilibrium

















i(hmin)di is the equilibrium mass of types hmin assigned as
manager. Note that w(hmin) > ﬂ W implies ￿ g(hmin)=g(hmin),w h e r e a s￿ g(hmin) <
g(hmin) c a nh o l do n l yi fw(hmin)= ﬂ W, according to equilibrium condition (c) of
De￿nition 2. In the following, the equilibrium measure of ￿rms I∗ is characterized
for the two polar cases of De￿nition 3.





i(h)di = g(h) for all h ∈ S\{hmin} and head
departments are of size s ∈ (0,g(h)],t h e r ea r eg(hK)/s ￿rms with single type hK,
g(hK−1)/s ￿rms with single type hK−1 and so on; the mass of ￿rms with type hmin is
given by ￿ g(hmin)/s. Moreover, we have the mapping α∗ : I → {αmin,...,αK},w h e r e
αmin = a(hmin),...,αK = a(hK). According to Proposition 2, if S is hypersegregated,






with w(hmin)= ﬂ W if ￿ g(hmin) <g (hmin) or ￿ g(hmin)=g(hmin), z∗ =( α∗,q∗). Together
with (11), these relations simultaneously determine ￿ g(hmin), w(hmin) and I∗ in an
equilibrium with complete segregation by managerial skill.
Second, suppose the equilibrium con￿guration of manager assignments S is sym-
metric. That is, all ￿rms have the average quality of types assigned as manager, i.e.,
19ﬂ h∗
























where (11) has been used for the latter equation. If S is symmetric, then ￿ g(hmin)









min − ﬂ h
∗), (14)
with w(hmin)= ﬂ W if ￿ g(hmin) <g (hmin) or ￿ g(hmin)=g(hmin),a n dﬂ h∗ as in equation
(13).
4E x a m p l e s
This section characterizes the equilibrium in speci￿c models of imperfect (i.e., mo-
nopolistic) product market competition among ￿rms at stage 3. (Existence of equi-
librium is discussed in appendix.) It is illustrated that the coexistence of diﬀerent
types of ￿rms (with diﬀerent gross pro￿ts and market ranges, respectively), which
stems from an asymmetric (e.g., hypersegregated) equilibrium con￿guration of man-
ager assignments, is indeed likely to emerge in standard models. (Note that gross
pro￿ts and market ranges are identical among ￿rms if and only if the con￿guration
of manager assignments is symmetric.)
Two monopolistic competition models are considered. The ￿rst speci￿cation
considers a version of the CES-utility model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), widely
used in macroeconomic theory, which allows for asymmetric ￿rms. The second
speci￿cation assumes linear demand schedules (i.e., quadratic utility), along the
lines of Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), also extended for asymmetric ￿rms.
204.1 CES-Utility
Let markets be symmetric in the sense that both population size and the skill struc-
ture is identical in each market. Consumers and workers are immobile, i.e., are
tied to their market location. In particular, managers work wherever they are lo-
cated. That is, the ￿rms￿ head departments are decentrally organized, i.e., cannot
be attributed to a speci￿c market location. (These additional assumptions can be
abandoned in the linear-demand model of section 4.2 in which product demand does
not depend on aggregate income at a market location.) Each ￿rm i produces one
variety of a diﬀerentiated good at each of its plants. Labor is the only input in
production. Firms have a constant-returns-to-scale technology, possibly diﬀering in
productivity βi of non-managerial labor. Normalizing the wage rate for production
labor to unity (i.e., ﬂ W =1 ), marginal production cost are given by 1/βi.
The utility function of the representative consumer in a market m is de￿ned over














σ > 1,w h e r exi,m is the quantity of variety i in market m and γi indicates the
perceived quality of goods in any market in which ￿rm i is active. Denoting con-
sumption expenditure in market m by Em and the price for variety i in m by pi,m,
















is the price index in market m.
Pm is de￿ned in a way such that indirect utility equals ￿real￿ expenditure Em/Pm.
Firms take both aggregate expenditure Em and the price index Pm as given in setting
prices.
As shown in appendix B, the equilibrium pro￿to f￿rm i ∈ Nm from monopolistic







21where αi := βiγi and Ξm :=
R
i∈Nm
(αi)σ−1di; Lm denotes the aggregate amount of
non-managerial labor, devoted to the production of goods, in market m.N o t et h a t ,
consistent with the general structure of the model, the quality of intangible assets of
￿rm i can be summarized by a single parameter αi.M a n a g e r sa ﬀect a ￿rm￿s pro￿ts
by determining either productivity βi (e.g., by creating an organizational structure)
or perceived quality γi (e.g., by designing products).
How can one conclude from (17) how the con￿guration of manager assignments
is characterized in equilibrium? Let Nm denote the measure of the set Nm, i.e., the
￿number￿ of establishments in market m ∈ [0,1]. As markets are symmetric ex ante,
we focus on equilibria in which the composition of ￿r mt y p e si st h es a m ei ne a c h
market. Thus, in equilibrium, L∗
m = L∗, Ξ∗
m = Ξ∗ and N∗














For simplicity, let there be just two types of managerial skills in the economy, i.e.,
H = {h0,h 1},w i t h0 <h 0 <h 1 < ∞.11
Now suppose that ￿rms are completely segregated by managerial skill. It is now
examined under which conditions this is consistent with an equilibrium. In order to
avoid the discussion of many case distinctions, we focus on an equilibrium in which
also (some) workers with skill h0 are assigned as manager. That is, we look for
an equilibrium with two types of ￿rms, one that hires managers from type h0 only
and one that hires type h1 only. Denote the respective sets of ￿rms by I0 and I1,
with equilibrium measures I0 and I1 = I∗ −I0, respectively. Equilibrium mappings
α∗ and q∗ are such that α∗
i = a(hk) ≡ αk and q∗
i ≡ qk for all i ∈ Ik, k =0 ,1,
respectively. With a share r ≡ I0/I∗ of ￿rms with skill h0 being active in each





0 +( 1− r)q
1¢
, (19)
11Extension to the general case of K + 1 types is straightforward.
22according to (18). Moreover, as Ξ∗ =
R N∗


























where the latter equation is implied by (19). Finally, with a population size of
unity in the economy, the equilibrium amount of production workers is given by




I∗ (rq0 +( 1− r)q1)
£
r(α0)





for all i ∈ Nm under hypersegregation with two ￿rm types (recall z∗ =( α∗,q∗)).
Given z∗, π(αi|z∗) increases in αi, in line with part (i) of Assumption 1. Also
part (ii) of Assumption 1 is ful￿lled as single ￿rms have measure zero and π(αi|z∗)
decreases in αk and qk, k =0 ,1 (i.e., pro￿ts at stage 3 decrease if competitive
pressure, which is determined by the correctly foreseen equilibrium values Ξ∗ and
I∗, increases). Note that π(αi|z∗) is strictly convex in αi if σ > 2.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,




ﬂ•), the following result emerges
from (21).
Proposition 5. (Monopolistic competition with CES-utility). Under utility
speci￿cation (15) with αi = βiγi,i fσ is suﬃciently high, then the equilibrium
con￿guration of manager assignments S is hypersegregated.
Proposition 5 provides an interesting intuition for the emergence of segregation
of ￿rms by managerial skill under monopolistic competition ￿ la Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). A high price elasticity of demand σ (i.e., products are good substitutes
such that monopoly power of ￿r m si sl o w ,a l lo t h e rt h i n g se q u a l )i sa s s o c i a t e dw i t h
a high intensity of product market competition. Consequently, a given diﬀerence
in the quality of intangible assets among ￿rms becomes increasingly magni￿ed into
diﬀerences in pro￿ts at stage 3 (i.e., π(αi|z∗) is strictly convex in αi.) This has
a symmetry-breaking feedback eﬀect on the job assignment of managers, resulting
from labor market competition. For instance, if a(•) is linear, then σ > 2 is suﬃcient
23for a hypersegregated con￿guration of manager assignments. Interestingly, starting
from a symmetric equilibrium (which may exist for a low value of σ), the model is
capable to generate the following comparative-static result. If the price elasticity of
demand σ increases such that the equilibrium becomes asymmetric, some ￿rms ac-
tually increase their market power by attracting better managers, while other ￿rms
see their (gross) pro￿ts shrink. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, a higher intensity
of product market competition may give rise to the emergence of ￿global players￿
in the ￿rst place, characterized by (relatively) high gross pro￿ts and wide market
ranges.
So far, existence of equilibrium has been supposed. In appendix C, the preced-
ing example is used to illustrate how to prove existence of an equilibrium for the
two polar cases of a hypersegregated and a symmetric equilibrium con￿guration of
manager assignments, respectively.
4.2 Quadratic Utility
Next, consider monopolistic competition in each market m under quasi-linear pref-
erences, adopted from Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), which are represented by the
















xi,mxj,mdidj + Y, (22)
β ≥ γ > 0,w h e r eY is the quantity of the numeraire. Again, labor is the only factor
of production. One unit of the numeraire requires one unit of labor and is produced
by perfectively competitive ￿rms. That is, again, ﬂ W =1 . Ai indicates the perceived
quality of goods supplied by ￿rm i in any market it is active. Moreover, assume
that production of one unit of x−goods requires ci units of labor in ￿rm i.T h a ti s ,
again, ￿rms may diﬀer in both productivity and perceived product quality at any
market location they enter.
From (22), the inverse demand function faced by ￿rm i ∈ Nm in market m reads




xj,mdj is the total quantity of the x−g o o ds u p p l i e di nm a r k e t
m. Firms compete in quantities, correctly taking total output Xm as given when
maximizing pro￿ts at stage 3.12 As shown in appendix B, the resulting pro￿ts at















Analogously to the preceding CES-utility example, we have N∗
m = N∗ and Θ∗
m =
Θ∗ for all m in an equilibrium.13 Again, let H = {h0,h 1}, and suppose α∗
i = a(hk) ≡
αk and q∗
i ≡ qk for all i ∈ Ik, k =0 ,1.T h u s ,N∗ is still given by (19). Moreover, in
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γI∗ (rq0 +( 1− r)q1)[rα0 +( 1− r)α1]
2β + γI∗ (rq0 +( 1− r)q1)
¶2
, (26)
i ∈ Nm.N o t e t h a t π(αi|z∗) is quadratic in αi. Again, applying Lemma 1, the
following result emerges from (26).
Proposition 6. (Monopolistic competition with quadratic utility). Under util-
ity speci￿cation (22) with αi = Ai − ci,i f a0(•) ≥ 0,t h e nS is hypersegregated.
For instance, complete segregation by managerial skill occurs if a(ﬂ hi)=ﬂ hi.T h e
s a m eh o l d sa sl o n ga sa(•) is not ￿too concave￿. In fact, the considered linear-demand
12As stated by Ottaviano and Thisse (1999, p. 10), ￿a ￿rm correctly neglects its impact on the
market, but must explicitly account for the impact of the market on its pro￿t￿ (italics original).
Assuming competition in prices, which requires horizontal diﬀerentiation of x−goods (i.e. β > γ),
would not alter the main conclusions from this example.
13Generally, markets do not have to be identical ex ante, as long as Assumption 1 is ful￿lled. For
instance, markets with ￿low￿ demand may just attract fewer ￿rms (or weaker ￿rms in terms of the
quality of their intangible assets, respectively). However, applicability of the proposed framework
is much simpler by focussing on identical markets ex ante, as in the examples of this section.
25model has similar features as often encountered in oligopoly theory, e.g. predicting
that given diﬀerences in unit costs lead to increasing diﬀerences in pro￿ts. It is this
property, which, typically, renders competition for managerial talent suﬃciently
intense to induce asymmetric sorting in the present framework.
5 Relation to Stylized Facts
This section discusses the empirical relevance of the model with respect to styl-
ized facts regarding the size distribution of ￿rms, and the relation of ￿rm size to
pro￿tability, productivity, average managerial skills and managerial remuneration.
(i) Size distribution of ￿rms. A highly skewed size distribution of ￿rms and estab-
lishments within industries has been frequently found in numerous studies. Whereas
the early literature hypothesized some stochastic growth process of ￿rms to generate
this outcome, subsequent research has either incorporated pro￿t-maximization into
models of stochastic ￿rm growth or studied market dynamics of ￿rms which diﬀer in
an innate characteristic. (For an excellent survey, see Sutton, 1997.) In contrast, we
have assumed that potential entrants in the economy are ex ante identical and there
are no random shocks. Nevertheless, the model is capable to explain a skewed size
distribution of ￿rms in two dimensions: ￿rst, in gross pro￿ts (which are naturally re-
lated to output, employment levels or sales), and, second, in the ￿rms￿ total number
of establishments (i.e., market ranges). Moreover, under plausible conditions, the
distribution of pro￿ts at the plant-level (￿pro￿ts at stage 3￿) is skewed. To see this,
recall from Lemma 1 that under the plausible property that single-market pro￿ts
π(αi|•) (pro￿ts at stage 3) are strictly convex in the ￿rm-speci￿c quality of intangi-
ble assets αi,a l s og r o s sp r o ￿ts Π(αi|•) (pro￿ts at stage 2) are strictly convex in αi.
Moreover, under weak conditions, this property gives rise to both strict convexity
of ￿rms￿ market ranges q∗
i in αi and hypersegregation of the equilibrium con￿gura-
tion of manager assignments, according to Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, respectively.
Thus, the size distribution of ￿rms and establishments tend to be convex mappings
of the distribution of managerial skills in the upper tale of the skill distribution
26(which contains all types actually assigned as managers in equilibrium). In other
words, small diﬀerences in the ￿rms￿ managerial skill levels become magni￿ed into
increasingly larger diﬀerences in both pro￿ts (at stages 2 and 3) and market ranges.
Thus, the size distribution of ￿rms and plants tends to be skewed to the right.
(ii) Firm size, pro￿tability and market shares. As pointed out by Schmalensee
(1989; stylized facts 4.11-4.13), in samples with many industries, U.S. ￿rms (and
business units) with higher market shares are also more pro￿table. Moreover, this
result seems to be driven mainly by manufacturing industries with high advertising-
to-sales ratios. Conventional measures of accounting pro￿tability often treat outlays
for advertising, R&D and the development of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital as current
expenses, although these raise future capabilities of ￿rms. This practice, which (at
least in the U.S.) is particularly adopted by large ￿rms (Schmalensee, 1989; styl-
ized fact 3.2), understates assets of ￿rms. It has been argued that exactly this
is the source of the often observed positive size-pro￿tability relationship (Salamon
(1985)). All of these ￿ndings ￿t well into the preceding analysis. According to
the model, some ￿rms are larger and have higher gross pro￿ts than others because
they incur higher sunk costs for developing intangible assets. Although ￿economic￿
pro￿tability is the same across ￿rms, accounting pro￿tability may diﬀer due to dif-
ferent accounting practices. Moreover, endogenous sunk costs (e.g., for advertising)
are naturally high in industries in which intangible assets (like trademarks) play a
signi￿cant role. This is consistent with a positive size-pro￿tability relationship in
advertising-intensive industries only.
(iii) Firm size, productivity and marginal costs. As reviewed by Bartelsman and
Doms (2000), there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity among both ￿rms and
establishments with respect to productivity levels. Longitudinal microdata sug-
gest that these diﬀerences are related to diﬀerences in manager quality. Moreover,
Roberts and Supina (2000) report a negative correlation between marginal costs and
￿rm size among U.S. manufacturing ￿rms. These ￿ndings are consistent with our
theoretical result that the quality of management, which, e.g., determines the pro-
ductivity of plants in the model, positively aﬀects the size of ￿rms in both dimensions
27(gross pro￿ts and market range) and the size of plants.
(iv) Sorting of managers. Evidence from matched employer-employee data strongly
suggests that larger ￿rms employ workers with higher average skill levels (e.g.,
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Troske (1999)). O￿Shaughnessy, Levine and
Capelli (2001) explicitly look at a measure for managerial skills, which is an index
combining formal education with job requirements like problem-solving skills and
predictability of tasks, known as ￿Hay points￿. They ￿nd that average managerial
skill levels substantially diﬀer across ￿rms.14 This supports the asymmetric sorting
hypothesis of managerial skills elaborated in this paper.
(v) Firm size and manager remuneration. Finally, there is overwhelming evi-
dence for a positive relationship between ￿rm size (or establishment size) and wages.
According to studies based on matched employer-employee data, a large part of this
premium seems to be related to imperfectly observable skills, like managerial tal-
ent, together with a sorting of good managers in large ￿rms. For instance, Troske
(1999) controls for many ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics which have been suggested by
economic theory on size-wage diﬀerentials, still ￿nding a substantial impact of ￿rm
size on wages. Also at the CEO level, larger ￿rms pay substantially higher wages
(Conyon and Murphy (2000)). Moreover, O￿Shaughnessy, Levine and Capelli (2001)
￿nd that their measure of managerial skills (￿Hay points￿) is a good predictor for
wages. In fact, our model predicts that the earnings distribution for managers tends
to be skewed to the right. To see this, recall that, according to the model, gross prof-
its per manager are equal to the average earnings of managers within ￿rms. Thus,
for instance, under complete segregation of ￿rms by managerial skill, the distribu-
tion of manager wages mimics the distribution of gross pro￿ts. As argued above,
the latter tends to be skewed to the right. This magni￿cation of skill diﬀerences
in increasingly larger earning diﬀerentials resembles the famous superstar economy
of Rosen (1981), however, for a diﬀerent reason. Rosen (1981) derives a strictly
14Even when controlling for job level and function, the authors report a standard deviation of
the ￿rm eﬀect in a regression of Hay points on several controls of 13.7 percent in 1986 and 12.7
percent in 1992.
28convex mapping from individual ability to individual earnings from the ability of
more talented individuals (acting as atomistic ￿r m s )t oc o v e raw i d e rr a n g eo fm a r -
kets. In Rosen (1982), a similar magni￿cation eﬀect arises with respect to manager
remuneration due to a complementarity between supervisory skills and the span of
control. In contrast, in the present analysis, managers develop intangible assets;
and diﬀerences in the ￿rms￿ quality of intangible assets tend to become magni￿ed
in pro￿td i ﬀerences. In turn, these pro￿td i ﬀerences determine earnings diﬀerences
of managers.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has focussed on the interaction between product market characteris-
tics and the market for managerial skills. Intangible assets like the organizational
structure of a ￿rm, ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge, product design, trademarks, etc., play
a key role for the performance of ￿rms. Development of intangible assets is the
responsibility of management. Consequently, and according to the main hypothesis
of this paper, managerial quality is a crucial factor for the productivity of ￿rms and
the perceived quality of products. It has been argued that, under free entry of ex
ante identical ￿rms and geographical non-rivalry of intangible assets, the nature of
product market competition determines how heterogeneous managerial skills sort
into head departments. In turn, this sorting process determines the goods market
structure at single locations and the size distribution of ￿rms in the economy.
Standard imperfect competition models imply that given diﬀerences among ￿rms
in productivity or product quality transmit into increasingly larger diﬀerences in
pro￿ts. This property is related to a high intensity of product market competition.
It has been shown that, under this condition, ￿rms tend to diﬀer endogenously in two
dimensions of ￿rm size: gross pro￿ts (typically related to a ￿rms￿ output, sales or
employment level) and the number of plants (market ranges). Thus, paradoxically,
if symmetry breaks down due to an increase in the intensity of product market
competition, ￿global players￿ with high market power may emerge in the ￿rst place.
29In particular, the main results of this paper are consistent with the well-known
regularity that the size distribution of ￿rms and establishments within industries is
skewed to the right. Moreover, the model predicts that ￿rm size is positively re-
lated to productivity, pro￿tability, average managerial skills and average managerial
wages. Thus, the model is not only capable to explain why ￿rms diﬀer in general,
but provides a uni￿ed framework which is consistent with speci￿c observations about
market structures, sorting of managers in ￿rms and managerial remuneration.
Appendix
A. Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Part (i) is proven ￿rst. If 0 < ￿ qi < 1, such that condition









∂αi > 0 from part (i) of Assumption 1 and the implicit function
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is strictly positive, according to
∂π(αi|•)
∂αi > 0, condition (4) and
∂￿ qi
∂αi > 0 from part (i).
If ￿ qi =1 , then part (ii) directly follows from
∂π(αi|•)
∂αi > 0. This concludes the proof.
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according to (A.2). If ￿ qi < 1,t h e n
∂￿ qi
∂αi > 0 and both terms in square brackets vanish,
according to (4) and (A.1), respectively. If ￿ qi =1 , the latter two summands in (A.3)
also vanish. Thus,
∂￿ qi




30if π(αi| ￿ z) is strictly convex in αi. Second, recall that ￿ qi < 1 implies that Q00(￿ qi) > 0























i > 0 if ￿ qi < 1,
∂2π(αi|￿ z)
∂α2
i > 0 and Q000(￿ qi) ≤ 0. This concludes the proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Part (i) is proven ￿rst. At stage 1, taking z∗ as
given, each ￿rm i ∈ I chooses an assignment function ￿ gi ∈ ￿ G (determining ﬂ hi and







































− w(h) ≤ λi (A.6)
with strict equality if ￿ g∗
i(h) > 0. This implies the following. Either each ￿rm i hires
only one type of manager or for any two diﬀerent types h,￿ h ∈ Si,w eh a v e






h − ￿ h
s
. (A.7)
Multiplying both sides of (A.6) with ￿ g∗























i(h) have been used. Substituting (A.8) into
(A.6) and observing condition (a) of De￿nition 2 yields (10). This proves part (i).
In order to prove part (ii), ￿rst, suppose there exist types h ∈ S and ￿ h/ ∈ S such
that h<￿ h.I ti sn o ws h o w nt h a tt h i si so n l yp o s s i b l ei fw(h) <w (￿ h). For this end,
suppose w(h) ≥ w(￿ h) and suppose ￿rm i replaces some managers of type h by some
31of type ￿ h, choosing an assignment function g0
i ∈ ￿ G instead of g∗
i ∈ ￿ G. Total wage
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i(h) > ﬂ h∗
i implies f(ﬂ h0
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i(h). As this violates (9) and, thus,
equilibrium condition (b) of De￿nition 2, we have w(h) <w (￿ h)= ﬂ W,w h e r et h e
latter equation follows from ￿ h/ ∈ S. However, this is impossible because type h
would then prefer not to work as manager. Thus, h ≥ ￿ h for all h ∈ S and ￿ h/ ∈ S,
i.e., there exists a cut-oﬀ level hmin ∈ H such that h ≥ hmin for all h ∈ S.W i t h
H = {h0,h 1,...,hK},t h es e tS of types assigned as manager equals {hmin,...,hK},
hmin ≥ h0.
In order to prove part (iii), note that w(hmin) ≥ ﬂ W, with strict equality if not
all types hmin are managers, according to condition (c) of De￿nition 2. As some
workers of type hmin are employed as managers (note that hmin is the least skilled
type of worker assigned as manager), w(h) > ﬂ W for all h>h min directly follows
from part (i).
Finally, to prove part (iv), note that (10) implies w(ﬂ h∗




equality if ﬂ h∗
i ∈ Si, according to part (i). Thus, if Si = {ﬂ h∗
i}, part (iv) is trivial. Now
suppose Si 6= {ﬂ h∗
i} and note that ﬂ h∗
i ∈ [hmin,h K], according to part (ii). Now suppose
that there is an equilibrium, with assignment functions ￿ g0
i ∈ ￿ G, average managerial
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i / ∈ Si.T h e na n y￿rm j 6= i which employs ￿ g0
j(ﬂ h0
i) > 0
managers of type ﬂ h0
i would prefer to replace this type by hiring ε￿ g0
i(h) managers from
each type h ∈ Si,w i t hε =￿ g0
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according to (7). Also note that wage cost w(ﬂ h0
i)￿ gj(ﬂ h0
i) are saved. Thus, net wage
cost savings from such a replacement are given by
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ﬂz0)/s for ﬂ h0
i / ∈ Si, i.e., there would be a pro￿table
deviation. However, according to condition (b) of De￿nition 2, this is inconsistent




ﬂz∗)/s. This concludes the proof. ⁄
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Consider strict convexity of f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ
ﬂz∗) in ﬂ hi for all i (at
equilibrium levels) ￿rst. Suppose Si 6= {ﬂ h∗
i} for some i, i.e., there exist h,￿ h ∈ Si such
that ￿ h>h .I f￿rm i replaces some managers of type h by some of type ￿ h (i.e., ￿rm i
chooses an assignment function ￿ g0
i ∈ ￿ G instead of ￿ g∗
i ∈ ￿ G) its average managerial skill
rises from ﬂ h∗
i to ﬂ h0
i > ﬂ h∗






i(h)=s and s ≤ g(h) for all h ∈ H by assumption; thus,
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with (A.12) implies ﬂ h0
i − ﬂ h∗
i = h−￿ h
s [￿ g0
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33Moreover, gross pro￿ts of ￿rm i now read f(ﬂ h0
i
ﬂ
ﬂz∗).A c c o r d i n gt oc o n d i t i o n( b )o f
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∂ﬂ hi . However, this is impossible
if f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ
ﬂz∗) is strictly convex in ﬂ hi;t h u s ,Si = {ﬂ h∗
i}. I nv i e wo fD e ￿nition 3, this
proves that the con￿guration of manager assignments S is hypersegregated under
strict convexity of f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ
ﬂz∗) in ﬂ hi (at equilibrium levels).
It remains to be shown that ﬂ h∗
i = ﬂ h∗ for all i in any equilibrium if f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ
ﬂz∗) is
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∗
i), (A.16)
respectively. Without loss of generality, suppose ﬂ h∗
i > ﬂ h∗
j for some i,j ∈ I, i 6= j.



























∂ﬂ hj if ﬂ h∗
i > ﬂ h∗
j and f(ﬂ hi
ﬂ ﬂz∗) is strictly concave in ﬂ hi.T h u s ,
ﬂ h∗
i 6= ﬂ h∗
j for i,j ∈ I, i 6= j can never hold in an equilibrium. This concludes the
proof. ⁄
Proof of Proposition 4. As argued in Remark 1, Saint-Paul (2001) studies a






i ∈ I and I =[ 0 ,1/s].N o t i n gt h a tz∗ is taken as given by ￿rms at stage 1, it is easy
to check that the formal structure of the present analysis ful￿lls the presumptions
in Saint-Paul (2001, Proposition 2). The result can, thus, directly deducted from
his analysis. ⁄
34B. Derivation of Equations (17) and (24)
Derivation of equation (17): Remember that, at any market m ∈ [0,1],t h e
production function of each ￿rm i ∈ Nm is given by
xi,m = βili,m, (B.1)
where li,m is the amount of production labor employed in ￿rm at market m.T h u s ,
with ﬂ W =1 , ￿rm i ∈ Nm solves max
pi,m
[(pi,m − 1/βi)xi,m] s.t. (16). Hence, the

































i,j ∈ Nm. The aggregate amount of production labor Lm employed in market
m is given by Lm =
R
j∈Nm














The pro￿to f￿rm i ∈ Nm at stage 3 is given by (pi,m − 1/βi)xi,m =
li,m
σ−1,a c c o r d i n g
to (B.1) and (B.2). Finally, use (B.4) to con￿rm equation (17).
Derivation of equation (24): Under monopolistic competition (in quantities)
with utility function (22), at stage 3, ￿rm i ∈ Nm solves max
xi,m
[(pi,m − ci)xi,m] s.t.





where αi = Ai − ci.I n t e g r a t i n go v e r a l li ∈ Nm,w h e r eNm has measure Nm,a n d
solving for Xm yields Xm = Θm
2β+γNm,w h e r eΘm =
R
i∈Nm
αidi. Substituting this into







. Substituting the latter two expressions, for







.N o t i n g t h a t πi,m =
(pi,m − ci)xi,m con￿rms equation (24).
C. Derivation and Existence of Equilibrium
This appendix illustrates in an exemplary way how to prove existence of an equilib-
rium (also sketching its full derivation) in the CES-utility case of section 4.1.
First, as in the main text, consider a hypersegregated equilibrium con￿guration
of manager assignments with two types of ￿rms. In such an equilibrium, we have






according to equation (11). Thus, the equilibrium share of ￿rms with low-skilled









with F ≥ 0 and η ≥ 1.N o t e t h a t F =0or η =1implies q∗
i =1for all i ∈ I.
Suppose, however, for the sake of concreteness, that all ￿rms have limited market
ranges, i.e., q∗
i ∈ (0,1), i ∈ I. Note that, with limited market ranges, q∗
i ful￿lls
π(αi|z∗)=Q0(q∗
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,w h e r eαk = a(hk), k =0 ,1, (C.1) and (C.2) have been
used for the latter equation.
Next, recall that α∗
i = αk = a(hk) and q∗
i = qk for all i ∈ Ik, k =0 ,1.T h u s ,











a(hk)σ−1 (1 − ￿ g(h0) − g(h1))s(￿ g(h0)+g(h1))




k =0 ,1, where (C.1) and (C.2) have been used for the latter equation.
Note that ￿ g(h0) <g (h0) in the supposed equilibrium, as some workers of type
h0 must be employed as production worker. Thus, w(h0)= ﬂ W =1 , according to
equilibrium condition (c) of De￿nition 2. Consequently, f(h0|z∗)=s must hold,
according to (12). Hence, equilibrium market ranges q0, q1, and the equilibrium mass
of type h0 assigned as manager, ￿ g(h0), are simultaneously given by (C.7), holding
for k =0 ,1,a n d
Γ
ˆ
a(h0)σ−1 (1 − ￿ g(h0) − g(h1))s








according to (C.6). This must yield qk ∈ (0,1) for k =0 ,1 and ￿ g(h0) ∈ (0,g(h)) to
be consistent with the supposed equilibrium. Moreover, in view of (C.6), existence of
this equilibrium can be con￿rmed if a(ﬂ hi)
(σ−1)η
η−1 is strictly convex in ﬂ hi at both ﬂ hi = h0
and ﬂ hi = h1, according to Proposition 3. Thus, we have derived all endogenous
variables as functions of the ￿fundamentals￿ of the economy: skill endowments h0,
h1 in supply g(h0), g(h1), demand parameter σ, technology parameters F and η
from speci￿cation (C.3), the function a(•) and the size s of head departments. Under
37appropriate assumptions about these fundamentals, the supposed equilibrium exists.
According to Proposition 1, f(h1|z∗) >f (h0|z∗) and q1 >q 0 for gross pro￿ts and
market ranges, respectively. Wages read w(h1)=f(h1|z∗)/s > f(h0|z∗)/s =
w(h0)= ﬂ W =1in this example, according to Proposition 2.
Second, analogously, suppose the con￿guration of manager assignment is sym-
metric, i.e., ﬂ h∗
i = ﬂ h∗ and, thus, α∗
i = a(ﬂ h∗) and q∗
i = q∗ for all i ∈ I. For simplicity,
let Q(•) ≡ 0 such that q∗ =1 .H e n c e ,Ξm = Ξ∗ = I∗a(ﬂ h∗)σ−1 for all m. Again, let
there be two skill types h0 and h1, h0 <h 1, both types being assigned as manager.





























respectively, where ﬂ h∗ =
h0￿ g(h0)+h1g(h1)
￿ g(h0)+g(h1) , according to equation (13). Using equations
(14), (C.10) and (C.11), as well as h0 = hmin and w(h0)= ﬂ W =1 , ￿ g(h0) is given by













A symmetric equilibrium exists if this yields ￿ g(h0) ∈ (0,g(h)) and a(ﬂ hi)σ−1 is strictly
concave in ﬂ hi at ﬂ hi = ﬂ h∗.F i n a l l y ,
w(h
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